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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ACTION-JOINDER,

WHETHER

SPLITTING,

CONSOLIDATION,

CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY

AND

AND

SEVERANCE-

PROPERTY DAMAGE

BEONE PERSON AND ARISING FROM ONE TORTIOUS ACT MAY
BE SEVERED AND LITIGATED SEPARATELY-In the Ohio case of Vasu v.
LONGING

TO

Kohlers, Inc.,' an action was instituted to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff growing out of a collision between
d~fendant's truck and plaintiff's automobile. In bar of such action, defendant relied on a judgment rendered in a prior suit brought by an insurance
company against it for damage done to the present plaintiff's automobile
in the same collision. Plaintiff had been reimbursed by the insurance
company for such damage and, under the policy, he had assigned his
right of action to them. That company had sued the defendant but had
failed to succeed. Such judgment was offered as a bar to the present
proceeding on the' theory that the plaintiff merely had but one cause
of action which could not be split into several claims and that, by litigating
a part, he had lost the right to' enforce the balance. The trial court overruled this contention'and gave judgment for plaintiff. The defendant
1 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N. E. (2d) 707 (1945).
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appealed and secured a reversal in the intermediate appellate tribunal.
The plaintiff then took the cause before the Ohio Supreme Court, which
held that the plaintiff had two causes of action as he had suffered injuries to two distinct rights, consequently the judgment in the action
for property damage did not serve to bar an action for personal injuries.
Although the fundamental question is not new, the case represents the
first time the Ohio Supreme Court has had occasion to pass directly
upon this point 3 and, by its decision, it has placed that state among
a small but growing minority which apply the same rule.

It is universally accepted that where a person has but one cause of
action he may not split it into several claims and base several actions
thereon, 4 for it is the policy of the law that a defendant should not
be harrassed by an unscrupulous plaintiff who might otherwise take advantage of the situation and bring several suits where one would suffice.
When, therefore, a judgment has been rendered, either in favor of or
against the plaintiff, his entire cause of action merges in the judgment
and is extinguished. 5 That judgment would then act as a bar to any
subsequent action on the claim.8
Difficulties arise, however, in deciding whether there is one or more
causes of action where the plaintiff suffers both personal injury and
property damage from the same wrongful act. If he is entitled to only
one cause of action, he -must be certain to include all elements of dainage,
whether to his person or to his property, for a judgment based on only
one of these elements would bar a second action. On the other hand, if
the wrongful act gives rise to two causes of action, recovery for one of
the injuries should not prevent another suit even between the same parties
as the issues in the first case are different from those in the second.
There is a pronounced division of authority, though, as to this question and
2 No opinion for publication. The decision of the intermediate tribunal is noted
at 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N. E. (2d) 707 at 710.

3 The question was considered in Le Blond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478, 171 N. P. 414 (1929), where the intermediate appellate tribunal achieved the same result. In Mayfield v. Kovac, 41
Ohio App. 310, 181 N. E. 28 (1932), the court indicated it would follow the one
cause of action rule but decided the case on grounds of waiver. The case of
Redman v. North River Ins. Co., 128 Ohio St. 615, 193 N. E. 347 (1934), presented
the same Issue, but when it reached the Supreme Court of Ohio it was decided on
other grounds.
4 1 C. J. S., Actions, § 102(b). See, for example, Camp v. Morgan, 21 Ill. 255
(1859).
5 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, §§ 150-2; Wann v. McNulty, 7 Ill. (2 Gil.) 355 (1845).
6 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 172; Fleming v. Ross, 225 Ii1. 149, 80 N. E. 92 (1907).
Items omitted through Ignorance, fraud, or mistake may nevertheless be made the
basis of another suit: Boos v. Claude, - S. D. -, 9 N. W. (2d) 262 (1943). See
also 2 A. L. R. 534.
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the majority of the states follow the rule that only a single cause of action
exists. 7 Typical of this view is the Minnesota case of King v. Chicago,
8
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company in which the plaintiff sustained
both. personal injuries and damage to his horse and wagon when struck
by defendant's train. His first suit, for personal injuries, resulted in a
judgment in his favor. He then instituted another action to recover for
damage done to his property, but the court ruled that the judgment
in the prior proceeding barred the second action for the reason that the
plaintiff had but one cause of action and could not split it. In order
to determine the number of causes of action a plaintiff has, courts applying the majority view look to the number of wrongful acts committed.
Where there is but a single wrongful act there can be only one cause
of action and the injuries suffered, whether to property or to person,
are merely items of damage to be collected in one suit. It is urged, in
support of this rule, that in most cases the plaintiff knows exactly how
much damage he has suffered by way of injury to himself and his prop6rty, can assert these clainis at one time, can hold litigation down to a
minimum, and can thereby promote speedy and economical justice. Nothing
can be gained, it is argued, by permitting two suits where one would serve
the same purpose.
A respectable minority, on the other hand, follow the view that two
or more causes of action may arise in favor of one person from a single
wrongful act. 9 This view is best illustrated by the Texas case of Watson
v. Texas & Pacific Railway Company.10 The plaintiff there accompanied
a shipment of his horses being transported over the defendant railroad.
7 Fiscus v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 153 Kans. 493, 112 P. (2d) 83 (1941);
Pillsbury v. Kesslen Shoe Co., 136 Me. 235, 7 A. (2d) 898 (1939) ; Dearden v. Hey,
304 Mass. 659, 24 N. E. (2d) 644, 127 A. L. R. 1077 (1939) ; Kimball v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 94 Miss. 396, 48 So. 230 (1909) ; Coy v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 186 Mo.
App. 408, 172 S. W. 446 (1915) ; Fields'v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa.
282, 117 A. 59 (1922); Flickner v. One Chevrolet Truck and Trailer, 178 S. C. 53,
182 S. E. 104 (1935); Holcombe v. Garland & Denwiddie, 162 S. C. 379, 160 S. H.
881 (1931). See also Bliss v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 447,
36 N. E. 65, 39 Am. St. Rep. 504 (1894) ; Doran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E.
647 (1888); Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Mathews, 115 Tenn. 172, 91 S. W. 194 (1906);
Booth v. Frankenstein, 209 Wis. 362, 245 N. W. 191 (1932).
8 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81 Am. St. Rep. 238 (1900).
9 Boyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 218 F. 653 (1914) ; Schemerhorn v. Los
Angeles Pac. R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 123 P. 351 (1912) ; Clancey v. McBride, 338
Ill. 35, 169 N. E. 729 (1930), reversing 251 Ill. App. 157 (1929); Ochs v. Public
Service Ry. Co., 81 N. J. L. 661, 80 A. 495, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240, Ann. Cas. 1912D
255 (1911); Smith v. Fischer Baking Co., 105 N. J. L. 567, 147 A. 455 (1929);
Sodowich v. Heimert, 108 N. J. L. 59, 154 A. 609 (1931) ; Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt
Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772, 57 L. R. A. 176 (1902), reversing 52 N. Y. S.
817, 31 App. Div. 302 (1898). See also Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Mosby, 250
F. 839 (1918); Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N. J. L. 439, 168 A. 796
(1933) ; Winters v. Bisaillon, 153 Or. 509, 57 P. (2d) 1095, 104 A. L. R. 968 (1936).
lo 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924 (1894).
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Both plaintiff and the horses were injured when the train was wrecked. A
judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in his first suit for damage
to his property. He thereafter instituted a second proceeding to recover
for his personal injuries. The prior judgment was offered as a bar to the
second suit, but the court overruled the plea and followed an English
precedent on this subject which had permitted two recoveries in a comparable situation. 1 Under this view, the number of causes of action
is determined not by the wrongs done but by the number of rights invaded. In support thereof, it has been argued that the number of rights
concerned is the 'more important, because without them there could be no
right of action even though the defendant might be guilty of fault. As
the plaintiff in these cases suffers a violation of distinct rights of personal security and of property, he would, therefore, possess two distinct causes of action. There are fundamental differences between the
right to recover for personal injuries and the right to recover for property damage which this view recognizes. First, the proof will be different
for in the suit for personal injuries plaintiff need prove only the injury
to his person, while in the case of property damage he must allege and
prove his ownership of or interest in the property plus the damage thereto. Second, there may be a difference in the statute of limitations as to
each. 12 Third, claims for personal injuries cannot be assigned 13 while
those for loss or damage of property may be. 14 Fourth, different rules
of damage may govern the measure of recovery.' 5 The logic behind this
view would therefore seem to outweigh the expediency of the other one.
Thus far, this discussion has dealt with cases where the same plaintiff attempts to bring both actions. Situations do arise, as in the present
case, where the suits are instituted by two different parties, particularly
where an insurance company has become subrogated to the rights of the
insured because it has reimbursed him for damage done to his property.
Should this fact have any effect upon either the minority or the majority
ru;e? The minority rule, logically, would not be changed since the dell Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141 (1884).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 83, § 15, requires that an action for Injury to the person
shall be commenced within two years. Section 16 fixes the limitation in actions to
recover for damage to personal property at five years.
13 North Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N. E. 222, 44 L. R. A. 177
(1897), reversing 58 Ill. App. 572 (1895).
14 Lasher v. Carey, 182 II. App. 147 (1913).
15 In Boyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 218 F. 653 at 659 (1914), the court noted
that the "mental processes for the ascertainment of righteous compensation for the
separate injuries are widely different. In the one case, it was a duty to estimate
the injury to the intricate machinery made by the art and skill of man; in the
other; the injury or mutilation alleged to the far more complex and mysterious
machinery made by Nature, or by Nature's God."
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cision in one case would not have any bearing on the other. 16 Application of the majority rule to this new factual situation, however, has produced a difference of opinion. Most of the courts operating thereunder
state that if a party cannot split a cause of action directly, he cannot do
it indirectly by assigning his right of action for property damage or by
permitting another to become subrogated thereto. 17 They would leave it
up to the other party to protect himself by joining in the one suit. To
this extent, their holdings are consistent. Two cases from such jurisdictions, however, have refused to apply the doctrine where the claims
are advanced by different parties. In Underwriters At Lloyd's Insurance
Company v. Vicksburg Traction Company,i s for example, the plaintiff insurance company had insured the damaged vehicle, had reimbursed the
owner for the damage done to it by the defendant, and had become
subrogated to his rights. The owner had recovered in a suit for personal injury when the insurance company instituted its action to recover for the damage to the car. Although the court expressly favored
the majority rule, it pointed out that an injustice might be done for
the insurance company could not control the insured insofar as bringing
a suit for his personal injury was concerned. Recovery on both claims
was, therefore, permitted. Underwood v. Dooley'0 presented the direct
opposite of the problem for theie the insurance company had sued first.
Again the court, while recognizing the majority rule, would not apply ib
6ecause they felt to do so would work an obvious injustice. That court
pointed out that the plaintiff had taken out insurance on his car to pro.
tect himself, whereas the application of the majority rule would deprive
him of the opportunity of recovering a greater sum for his personal injuiies than he would be apt to receive under the policy. Further breach
has been made in the majority rule by recognition of the fact that it
operates only for the benefit of a defendant who asserts it. Being a defense to be pleaded by that defendant, it can be waived and is waived
20
by inaction.
16 Le Blond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Ohio
App. 478, 171 N. E. 414 (1929). The doctrine of estoppel by verdict, which might
apply if the same plaintiff litigates both claims: Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach
Co., 346 Ill. 266, 178 N. E. 496 (1931), would have no bearing where the two suits
are conducted by different parties, especially if the assignment occurs before the
estoppel has arisen: Schafer v. Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N. E. (2d) 963 (1938).
17 Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83, 34 S. W. (2d)
1059
(1931); Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317, 34 A. (2d) 96 (1943); Sprague v.
Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 P. 960, 47 A. L. R. 529 (1926). See also Hayward v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N. W. (2d) 316 (1942).
18106 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 319 (1913).
19 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686, 64 A. L. R. 656 (19.9).
20 Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Endsley, 167 Ga. 439, 145 S. E. 851, 62 A. L. R.
256 (1928); Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S. W. 129 (1916); Mayfleld v.
Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N. E. 28 (1932). See also cases cited in 62 A. L. R.
263.
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The strongest argument to support the majority view is fhlt the
single cause of action rule will prevent the crowding of courts with unnecessary litigation. The minority view follows a less practical but a more
logical path. Each jurisdiction concerned has chosen a measuring stick
regarded by it as the most important. When it is recalled that the
Dlaintiff usually institutes suit in order to obtain reimbursement for
damage done to his rights rather than to punish the defendant for a
wrong committed, the question of the number of rights invaded would
seem to be the more important one. Such, at least, seems to be the Ohio
view and it may now be welcomed as a member of a growing minority
of states who feel the same way.
W. A. HEINDL
BANKS

AND

BANKING

-INSOLVENCY

AND

DISSOLUTION

-

WHETHER

STATUTE GIVING STATE AUDITOR EXCLUsivE RIGHT TO LIQUIDATE INSOLVENT
BANK PREVENTS STOCKHOLDER FROM MAINTAINING REPRESENTATIVE SUIT

ON BEHALF OF BANK-Problems concerning the right of a shareholder in a
closed bank to maintain a representative suit were involved in the recent

case of Rinn v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago ' wherein,
several years after the bank had undertaken voluntary liquidation pro-

2
ceedings and had paid off all depositors and creditors pursuant to statute,
the State Auditor had caused a receiver to be appointed on the ground
that the capital was impaired. Prior to the appointment of such receiver,
a stockholder in the bank had begun proceedings against the liquidating
trustee and the other directors on a claim of malfeasance and misfeasance
but that action had been delayed because of pending motions to dismiss.
These motions were not passed upon until after appointment of the State
Auditor's receiver and were then denied, although the cause was consolidated with the receivership proceeding. Subsequently, the defendants
in the stockholder's suit moved to vacate the order of consolidation and to
renew the motion to dismiss. Other stockholders intervened and asked permission to file an amended complaint charging that the Auditor's suit
was begun merely to obstruct the stockholder's action. The trial court
vacated the order of consolidation, sustained the motion to dismiss, refused
permission to file the amended pleading, and dismissed the case for want
of equity. The net result was to deny the accounting sought for., On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District reversed on the ground
that to deny such suit would be to leave the plaintiffs without a remedy,
and that since every obligation of the bank, except to its shareholders, had

1 326 Il. App. 376, 62 N. E. (2d) 8 (1945).
2

Il.

Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16%, § 15.
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been discharged the statute purporting to give the State Auditor exclusive
jurisdiction over its affairs 3 had no application.
Only one case was cited to support the action taken, that of Harris'
Estate v. West Grove Savings Bank. 4 That case depended upon an Iowa
statute similar to the Illinois provision, 5 but involved a proceeding by the
State Superintendent of Banking to be appointed liquidating receiver for
the bank there concerned. Upon finding that all depositors and creditors
had been paid in full, the court denied the relief sought on the ground that
the liquidation of the bank was purely an auxiliary remedy to settle private differences between the shareholders in which there was no public interest so state action was unnecessary and without object. Whether the
same view existed in this state prior to the instant decision is a matter of
doubt and the case in question is the first one to hold that, after public interests in a bank have been satisfied, the State Auditor is no longer concerned in its liquidation.
Before the present statute was enacted purporting to place exclusive
authority in the State Auditor, there was no question but what equitable
remedy would lie on behalf of a stockholder for the appointment of a receiver where there had been a fraudulent use of the bank's funds even
though power in the state to liquidate and dissolve such corporations was
recognized. 6 That view prevailed in other jurisdictions also,7 even where
power to appoint a receiver was given to some public official placed in a
position to supervise banking activities, 8 since such statutes were not
treated as possessing exclusive effect. For these reasons, general creditor's
bills have been sustained 9 as well as suits based on fraud or abuse of
power.' 0
Courts of equity, however, have no general power to dissolve corporations and can exercise such power, including the right to appoint liquidat3 Ibid., § 11.

4 207 Iowa 41, 217 N. W. 477 (1928)..

Iowa Code 1939, Ch. 412, § 9154.03.
6 Chandler Mortgage Co. v. Loring, 113 Ill. App. 423 (1904).
7 Greeley v. Provident Say. Bank, 103 Mo. 212, 15 S. W. 429 (1891); Holland
Banking Co. v. Robertson, 237 Mo. App. 629, 149 S. W. (2d) 909 (1941), citing
Waugh v. Williams, 342 Mo. 903, 119 S. W. (2d) 223 (1938), Selle v. Selle, 337
Mo. 1234, 88 S. W. (2d) 877 (1935), and Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo.
947, 56 S. W. (2d) 9 (1932).
8 Dickerson v. Cass County Bank, 95 Iowa 392, 64 N. W. 395 (1895).
9 Worth v. Piedmont Bank of Morgantown, 121 N. C. 343, 28 S. E. 488 (1897).
10 Smith v. Jones, 120 Fla. 237, 162 So. 496 (1935) , Knott v. Morris, 101 Fla. 1299,
134 So. 615 (1931) ; Abbott v. Morris, 101 W. Va. 127, 132 S. E. 372 (1926).
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ing receivers, only if the same is conferred on them by statute." It is,
therefore, within the power of the legislature to withhold such authority or
to grant it on any terms it may see fit. This fact is well illustrated by the
decision in People ex rel. Barrett v. Shurtleif,12 where it was decided that,
in the absence of fraud and in the absence of statutory authority, a court
was lacking the power to remove a receiver ippointed by the State Auditor
and mandamus would lie to expunge such an order.
The present provision of the Illinois statute places control of liquidating proceedings over state banking corporations, entirely and exclusively
in the State Auditor's and vests in him all rights of action belonging to
the banl. Certainly, in the public interest and prior to th6 satisfaction of
the claims of creditors, no one should be permitted to interfere with that
official's attempts to realize on the assets of the bank. That point was expressly passed upon in McIlvaine v. City National Bank & Trust Company
of Chicago1 4 where a stockholder was denied the right to maintain a representative suit based on a claim that, prior to appointment of a liquidating
receiver, the bank had transferred some of its assets for an insufficient
consideration for it was there held that such cause of action, if any existed,
was solely under the control of the State Auditor and he alone could sue
thereon. 15 In a still later decision, that of Lorimer v. Rosehill Cemetery
Company,16 the right of creditors and stockholders of a closed bank to recover the assets thereof which had allegedly been fraudulently sold by its
directors was denied, even though the State Auditor had not appointed a
receiver until twenty years after the bank's collapse, on the ground that
such official, when appointed, had exclusive control over such claims.
While it appears that the public and the creditors still had an interest
the
closed banks in these cases, it does not seem that t~he rules there
in
enunciated should cease to apply merely because the public interest, as
represented by unpaid creditors, has been subserved. So long as the banking corporation exists, i. e. until decree of dissolution is actually entered
upon final liquidation, the public generally still has an interest in the
11 Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N. E. 420 (1892) ; People
v. Weigley, 155 Ill. 491, 40 N. E. 300 (1895) ; Coquard v. National Linseed Oil Co.,
171 Ill. 480, 49 N. E. 563 (1898). See also Miner, A Treatise on the Law of Bank
Receiverships and Stockholders' Liability In Illinois (1934), p. 9. Of similar effect
is the holding in Feess v. Mechanics State Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 115 P. 563, L. R. A.
1915A 606 (1911).
12 353 Ill. 248, 187 N. E. 271 (1933).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16%, § 11.

Ill. App. 496, 42 N. E. (2d) 93 (1942), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Immw
3, cause transferred 371 Ill. V65, 21 N. E. (2d) 737 (1939).
15 The Meilvaine decision was not referred to in the instant case, nor was any
14314
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attempt made to distinguish the same from the facts there concerned.
is 325 Ill. App. 258, 59 N. E. (2d) 893 (1945), abst. opin.
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corporation for it was brought into existence only through public fiat as
expressed in the.Banking Act. 1 7 Until the bank has actually ceased to
exist, even though it has but a "mere shell of a charter," the designated
public official should continue to exercise the power and perform the duties
exclusively vested in him and no private person, no matter how personally
interested, should be allowed to assume these functions. If such person
believes the public official is derelict in the performance of his duties, his
remedy would seemingly lie in mandamus rather than to substitute himself
8
as proper plaintiff in the conduct of the litigation.'
If the litigation in the instant case eventually results in a judgment
on the merits' 9 and is again appealed, it is likely that the question of the
right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit will be re-examined and may
there be decided in an entirely opposite fashion. If not, the case becomes
a questionable precedent for future litigation of this character for the
decision seems to be without adequate foundation and contrary to earlier
cases which it does not claim to overrule.

E. JUSTUS.
EXECUTION-EXECUTION AGAINST THE PERSON-WHETHER JUDGMENT
DEBTOR IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE ISSUANCE OF BODY
EXECUTION OR WHETHER WRIT SHOULD ISSUE SOLELY ON SUFFICIENT AFFI-

DAVIT By CREDITOR-In the recent case of Morris v. Schwartz,' the Appellate Court for the First District was asked, for the first time, to pass upon
the question of the necessity for granting notice and hearing prior to the
, § 11, is not as specific as the Busi17 That statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16
ness Corporation Act, Ibid., Ch. 32, § 157.91, on the point when corporate existence
actually ceases, but there can be no question but what the mere appointment of a
liquidating receiver does not, ipso facto, terminate existence: Chemical Nat. Bank
v. Hartford Deposit Co., 156 fll. 522, 41 N. E. 225, (1895), affirmed in 161 U. S. 1,
16 S. Ct. 439, 40 L. Ed. 595 (1896) ; Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S. 462, 26 L. Ed.
832 (1882) ;. Wittnebel v. Loughman, 9 F. Supp. 465 (1935); United States Nat.
Bank of La Grande v. Pole; 2 F. Supp. 153 (1932) ; Rist v. Hartvigsen, - S. D. -,
19 N. W. (2d) 830 (1945).
is The analogy between banking and insurance company liquidations is close.
Control over the latter is exclusively vested in the Director of Insurance by Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 73, § 813. No private person may assume the powers of the
Director according to People ex rel. Palmer v. Niehaus, 356 Ill. 104, 190 N. E. 349
(1934), and People ex rel. Lowe v. Marquette Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 351 Ill. 516, 184
N. E. 800 (1933), but mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty: People
See also American
ex rel. Gosling v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 106 N. E. 524 (1914).
Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N. E. (2d) 122 (1943).
19 The cause was remanded with directions to permit the filing of amended pleadings.
Friend, J., and Scanlan, J., each
1326 Ill. App. 274, 61 N. E. (2d) 690 (1945).
wrote a specially concurring opinion.
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issuance of a body execution.2 In that case, Morris had judgment against
Schwartz on a claim arising under a contract. He caused execution to
issue thereon. Prior to the issuance of execution but after the debt had
been contracted, Schwartz gave a chattel mortgage to one Fuchs on certain
goods to secure a purported loan made by Fuchs. That mortgage was duly
recorded. The execution was subsequently returned unsatisfied. Morris
then notified Schwartz that he would file an affidavit for body attachment
and ask for execution thereon.3 Schwartz filed written objections thereto
supported by affidavit. Plaintiff moved to strike defendant's affidavit and
was met by written objections to his motion. Upon a hearing ordered by
the trial court, plaintiff was required to produce evidence to sustain the
allegations of fraud made in his affidavit. He refused on the ground that
he was not required to do so. His application for body execution was
denied and a further order was entered denying his motion to strike defendant's affidavit from the files. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court at first
reversed both orders and remanded the cause with directions. On rehearing, it denied plaintiff's application for a body execution on the ground
that the affidavit supporting the request was defective. It did, however,
sustain his other motion on the theory that the statute does not contemplate
any notice and hearing prior to the issuance of a body execution.
At common law, imprisonment for debt, particularly under a capias ad
satisfaciendum, was well recognized 4 although distinctions have since been
made between judgments obtained in contract actions and those based on
torts where malice was the gist of the action. It should be remembered,
therefore, that the instant case is one based on a contract. The present Illinois statute5 provides for execution against the person upon (a) the return
of an execution unsatisfied in whole or in part; (b) the filing of an affidavit that a demand had been made upon the debtor; (c) a statement
therein that the judgment creditor verily believes such debtor has estate
not exempt from execution which he unjustly refused to surrender; (d)
that since the debt was contracted or the cause of action accrued the debtor
has fraudulently conveyed, concealed, or otherwise disposed of some part
of his estate with a design to secure the same to his own use or to defraud
his creditors, which facts are to be demonstrated by affidavit based upon
knowledge, information and belief tending to show that the belief is wellfounded; and then not until (e) the plaintiff procures an order from a
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 65.
33n the affidavit, Morris recited the execution of the debtor's chattel mortgage
to Fuchs to substantiate his own allegation of fraudulent concealment of property.
4 Huntington v. Metzger, 158 Il1. 272, 41 N. E. 881 (1895), reversing 51 Ill. Apr.
222 (1893).
5 Laws 1871-2, p. 505, § 62; 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 65.
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judge or master in chancery in the same county certifying that probable
cause is shown in such affidavit..)
A careful study of Illinois decisions shows no prior cases in which the
question of necessity for notice and hearing has arisen since the enactment
of the present statute. A search for decisions in other jurisdictions also
reveals a dearth of cases on the point. Massachusetts requires express
notice to the debtor, 7 as does also South Dakota. 8 In Indiana, a rule to
show cause why body execution should not issue is necessary, 9 and in
Kansas it has been held that a requirement for notice and hearing was
implied. 10 In the case of In re [Kleene,11 however, a Rhode Island debtor
had been confined to jail by commitment under an execution on a judgment recovered in an action of assumpsit. Writ for body execution had
been issued by order of court upon application of the judgment creditor
supported by affidavit which charged the debtor with fraud in the retention of his property. The debtor sought release by habeas corpus, contending that the writ for body attachment was void because it had been granted
on an ex parte hearing. Relief was denied when the court held that the
local statute did not prescribe notice and that to give one would, in many
cases, defeat the purpose of the statute. It might be mentioned that the
12
Illinois statute resembles closely the provision found in Rhode Island,
hence the holding in the instant case is not without some support.
As the Illinois statute does not expressly require notice and hearing,
defendant sought to raise an inference that the same were required by
6 The Act of Feb. 17, 1823. Laws 1823, p. 158, required the affidavit of plaintiff

to

be proved before a jury of not less than six nor more than twelve householders.
That provision was abolished In 1845, R. S. 1845, Ch. 52, § 1, and in lieu thereof
the writ was to issue when plaintiff filed his affidavit before a justice of the peace
and recited the fact that the debtor refused to surrender his or her estate for the
satisfaction of an execution. That statute seems to be the forerunner for the
present Insolvent Debtor's Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 72, § 1 et seq., in that
Section 2 of the 1845 statute provided that courts of probate, now county courts.
should have the sole power, in the first instance, to hear and determine all applications for discharge from imprisonment for debt. The law remained in that
condition until 1872, when the present law was enacted. Although Ill. Const. 1870,
Art. II, § 12, provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt unless upon
refusal to deliver up his estate for the benefit of creditors, statutes of this character have been held constitutional: Huntington v. Metzger, 158 Ill. 272, 41 N. E.
881 (1895).
7 Lane v. Hlolman, 145 Mass. 221, 13 N. E. 602 (1887).
S J. I. Case Co. v. Alick, 68 S. D. 423, 3 N. W. (2d) 482 (1942).
9 Krohn v. Templin, 2 Ind. 146 (1850).
10 Tatlow v. Bacon. 101 Kan. 26, 165 P. 835 (1917).
-Although Kan. Gen. Stat.
1935, Ch. 60, § 60-3472, provides that the judge may issue the writ upon being
satisfied by the affidavit of the judgment creditor or his attorney, it does not exclude the theory that notice and hearing are necessary.
11 15 R. I. 294, 3 A. 418 (1886).
12 Gen. Laws R. I., 1938, Ch. 552, § 11.
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13
That provision directs
reference to another provision of the same statute.
that no body execution shall issue where the judgment was obtained in a
tort action unless the trial court or jury shall make a special finding that
malice is the gist of the action, and except where defendant shall refuse to
deliver up his estate for the benefit of creditors. He argued that since a
special finding of malice can only be had upon a hearing, a similar hearing
must also be had when the debt arises out of a contractual relationship.
There is an intrinsic difference between the two, for a debtor may be imprisoned for failure to pay a judgment where there is a special finding of
malice regardless of whether he has or has not any estate with which to
satisfy the judgment; while Section 62 allows incarceration in tort or contract cases only when the debtor actually has estate which he refuses to
surrender or in cases where there is a strong presumption of attempt to
defraud creditors.

The decisions in Pappas v. Reabus14 and Marshall Field & Company
v. Freed15 help point out the fallacy in defendant's argument. In the
first of these cases, defendant was found guilty of a tort and there was a
special finding of malice. A writ for body attachment was issued. Defendant argued that the writ was void because it was issued without any
affidavit that defendant had refused to deliver up her estate, claiming that
both the special finding of malice and a finding that she had refused to surrender her property were necessary. The court distinguished between the
two bases for imprisonment and held the finding of malice was enough to
support the writ. In the Freed case, by contrast, it was declared that the
purpose of Section 62 was to authorize execution against the body upon
any judgment, whether in tort or contract, provided the plaintiff would
file an affidavit complying with the requirements of that section.
There is further evidence that notice and hearing is not contemplated by
6
Section 62 for certain provisions of the Insolvent Debtor's Act' would be
unnecessary if notice and hearing were required. Section 5 thereof, for
example, provides that where any debtor is arrested or imprisoned for
debt upon charge of fraud, or upon execution on the charge of refusal to
surrender his estate for the payment of any judgment, he shall be entitled
"to have the question, whether he is guilty of such fraud, or has refused
to surrender his estate, tried by a jury who may be summoned for that
purpose." Such trial, of course, comes after imprisonment occurs. As the
legislature has seen fit to allow these sections to remain in the statute, it
13

Ii. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 5.

14 299 InI. App. 499, 20 N. E. (2d) 327 (1939).

15 269 InI. 558, 109 N. E. 1018 (1915).
16 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 72, §§ 2 and 5.
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can only be inferred that it was the legislative intention to have Section
62 operate without these requirements.
It should also be noticed that under Section 62 the judgment creditor
is to make his application to the judge of the court or to a master in chancery in the same county. While the former could entertain a true hearing,
it is hardly conceivable that the legislature intended that the defendant
would have a right to appear and demand a trial before the latter since
he is only a quasi-judicial official. He might hear evidence and make
recommendations, but if the statute purported to enlarge the scope of his
office by vesting him with discretion there would be serious doubts as to
its constitutionality. 17 All such doubt is removed by holding that issuance
of the writ is a ministerial function involving no exercise of discretion.18
A second interesting point in the case related to the sufficiency of the
affidavit filed by plaintiff. Earlier cases from this and other jurisdictions
did not require that any great detail be set out therein. A statement of the
amount of principal and interest due upon a judgment, expressed in one
lump sum, was held sufficient in Kenan v. Carr.19 A recital that the defendant had money which could not be reached by fiere facias was enough,
according to Dozier v. Dozier.20 In Fergus v. Hoard21 it was held that an
affidavit sufficiently complied with the statute when it recited that the
defendant had refused, and still refuses, to surrender his estate for the
satisfaction of an execution, the fact being implied that defendant had
property which he refused to surrender. Six years later, in Tuttle v. Wilson,22 the doctrine of the Fergus case was modified to the extent of requiring an allegation that the defendant had estate, lands and tenements, goods
or chattels, liable to be seized and sold upon execution, specifying them as
near as may be. The affidavit filed in Doty v. Colton23 was held sufficient
because it stated facts to show that the defendant had property which he
refused to surrender, and had fraudulently concealed and withheld said
property after demand.
After the adoption of Section 62, however, it was declared in the case
Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 139 N. E. 5 (1923).
Civ. Prac. Rules, Municipal Court of Chicago, Rule 77, where the instant case
arose, carries out this idea for itis there provided that, upon arrest, the party
shall be brought before the court and, if he fails to pay the judgment, he shall be
imprisoned until he shall "be discharged according to law." No exercise of discretion is called for thereby.
19 10 Ala. 867 (1846).
2030 Ga. 523 (1860).
2115 Ill. 357 (1854).
2224 Ill. 553 (1860).
23 90 11. 453 (1878).
17

18
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of Peiffer v. French,24 that statutes of this character are penal in nature,
hence are subject to the rule of strict construction. The Tuttle, Doty, and
Peiffer cases support the view that the provisions of the statute must be
strictly met so*it is the duty of the judge or master in chancery to demand
that the affidavit be in strict compliance therewith. In the light thereof,
there was no error in holding that the affidavit in the instant case was
defective. That statute calls not only for a statement that the judgment
creditor verily believes that the debtor has estate not exempt from execution which he unjustly refuses to surrender, but also requires that he set
forth, upon his knowledge, information, and belief the facts tending to
show that said belief is well-founded. As a well-founded belief can only
rest on basic facts, these facts ought to be expressly disclosed for a mere
belief alone will not suffice. 25 Language of the California Supreme Court
in Fkumoto v. Marsh26 bears out this view for the court there indicated
that if an affidavit resting in any essential part on information and belief
is required, and such affidavit does not state facts on which such belief is
founded, it does not confer jurisdiction to issue the order.
The growing tendency to look with disfavor upon imprisonment for
debt leads to the conclusion that every requirement of the statute permitting such imprisonment must be closely followed. The affiant must b6
meticulous, for failure to comply with statutory requirements will render
his affidavit defective. By demanding strict compliance, especially where
there is no requirement for hearing prior to the arrest, courts will be able
to protect honest but unfortunate debtors from oppression.

J. J. LIMPERIS.
GARNISHMENT-PERSONS

AND PROPERTY SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT-

BoxEs MAY BE REACHED
comment appeared in a recent issue of
Court decision
REVIEW on the Appellate

WHETHER OR NOT CONTENTS OF SAFETY DEPOSIT
BY GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGs-A

the CHICAGO-KENT LAW
in Morris v. Beatty.' Subsequent thereto, leave to appeal was granted by
the Illinois Supreme Court, and the latter reversed the Appellate Court and
24376 Ill. 376, 33 N. E. (2d)
(2d) 983 (1940).
25

591 (1941), affirming 306 Ii.

App. 326, 28 N. E.

The only facts recited in the affidavit in the instant case related to the execu-

tion and delivery of the chattel mortgage.

The allegations as to lack of con-

sideration therefor are all made upon "belief" rather than charged as positive
fact.
26 130 Cal. 66, 62 P. 303 (1900).
1 323 Ill. App. 390, 55 N. E.
REVIEW 182.

(2d)

830 (1944),
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affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of Chicago which had discharged the garnishee. 2 The final outcome of the case rested upon the failfire of the judgment creditor to traverse the allegation contained in the
garnishee 's answer that it had no control over the safety deposit box in
question 3 as well as his failure to sustain the burden of proof. 4 On the
primary issue argued by the parties, to-wit: whether a safety deposit box
may be the subject of garnishment, the court declined to express any
opinion upon the ground that it was not required to pass thereon. There
is reason to believe, therefore, that in a proper case the Illinois Supreme
Court might yet decide that the contents of safety deposit boxes can be
reached by garnishment proceedings.
The Supreme Court decision does, however, pose some practical difficulties in the way of the judgment creditor who might wish to reach such
property particularly with reference to discharging the burden of proof.
If, to be successful, he must first independently show that the safety deposit box contained property subject to garnishment and then establish
that the garnishee, by permitting the debtor to have access thereto after
service of ,the writ, has allowed the property therein to escape from seizure,
he is placed in a desperate position. No such impossible requirement is
imposed in case the property garnisheed be a bank account, for example,
as the garnishee's records may be subpoenaed to establish the necessary
facts. 5 It is only by indirection and inference that he could establish a
semblance of a case as to the contents of a safety deposit box.
The nature of the business and the methods of operating safety deposit
vaults are too well known to permit the proprietors thereof to say they have
no control over the renter's deposit box even though it be but a negative
type of control. It is also equally well known that such boxes are usually
rented as storage spaces for the protection of valuable articles. It is not
reasonable to suppose that the judgment debtor seeks entrance to the box,
after service of garnishment process, for the purpose of adding to the
valuables therein contained. Hence the inference necessarily follows that
2390 Ill. 568, 62 N. E. (2d) 478 (1945).
3 Traverse to the garnishee's answer, so as to raise an issue of fact, is required
by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, § 7. In the absence thereof, the answer must be

accepted as true: Rankin v. Simonds, 27 Ill. 352 (1862).
4 The burden is generally on the judgment creditor: Rippen v. Schoen, 92 Ill.
229 (1879); Wilhelmi v. Haffner, 52 Ill. 222 (1869).
It may shift to the
garnishee: McCoy v. Williams, 6 Ill. (1 Gil.) 584 (1844). The Appellate Court
had concluded that the conduct of the garnishee in permitting the judgment debtor
to have access to the box had placed on it the burden of proving either that the

box contained no property subject to garnishment or else that none of the contents had been removed: 323 Ill. App. 390 at 402, 55 N. E. (2d) 830 at 835.
5 Il.

Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, § 7, states that the trial on the answer of tho

garnishee and the traverse thereto "shall be conducted as in other civil cases."
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his purpose must be to remove his property to prevent its seizure by the
creditor. The proprietor, as a reasonable person, could well expect such
result to follow from allowing the debtor to have uncontrolled access to
the box and its contents, and might be said to be willing to co-operate in
that plan.
As the judgment creditor could prove no more than that a safety
deposit box had been rented to the debtor and that the latter had been
granted access thereto after service of the writ, such proof should be sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the garnishee. The proprietor
of the vault should then be held to assume the burden of proving otherwise
or else be responsible to see to it that enough valuables remain on hand to
permit satisfaction of the creditor's claim. 6 If a prima facie case of that
character cannot be accepted as the basis for judicial action against the
garnishee, then it is time that the legislature provided some statutory substitute and preferably one comparable to that used when access is required
7
to the safety deposit box of a deceased person.

INSURANCE--ACTIONS

ON POLICIEs-WHETHER INSURER IS LIABLE TO

INSURED FOR REFUSAL TO SETTLE CLAIM UNDER POLICY LEADING TO JUDGMENT AGAINST INSURED IN ExcEss OF POLICY LIMITS-An invitee of a cer-

tain country club had been injured while on the club premises and brought
suit for the injury sustained. The club carried a public liability policy
with an insurance carrier in an amount less than the ad damnum named
in the complaint, which insurance carrier took over the defense of the suit.
The invitee indicated a willingness to settle the case for $3500 before trial
and, even after securing a judgment for $20,000, had been willing to settle
for $8000 while the personal injury action was pending on appeal. Both
of these proposed settlements were for less than the face amount of the
insurance carried although the judgment exceeded the policy limits. Although there was some indication that the insurer's trial attorney favored
settlement in 'each instance, the insurance carrier refused to settle. The
appellate court sustained the judgment for the invitee and leave to appeal
was denied by the Supreme Court.' Thereafter, the country club paid that
part of the judgment in excess of the amount of the insurance and sued
6 It has been held that a garnishee who permits the debtor to withdraw the
amount of his balance after service of garnishment process cannot complain against
a judgment in favor of the creditor for the full amount originally due the latter:
Robinson & Co. v. Marr, 206 Ill. App. 12 (1917), abst. opin. Moreover, the right
to retain the debtor's property may be lost to the garnishee by its inequitable
conduct after service of summons: Obergfell 'v.Booth, 218 Ill. App. 492 (1920).
7 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 114, § 331.
1 See Halladay v. Olympia Fields Country Club, 295 Ill. App. 622, 15 N. E. (2d)
345 (1938), leave to appeal denied 296 Ill. App. xxiiU.
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the insurance company for reimbursement. The gist of such action was
that the refusal to settle was arbitrary and unreasonable and amounted
to a breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff to act honestly and in good
faith. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict but such motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff under an instruction which made it mandatory for the jury to find
that a refusal to settle, contrary to advice of counsel, amounted to bad
faith. The defendant appealed from the resulting judgment. It was held,
in Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company,2 that an insurance company could be liable under circumstances
such as these for fraud, negligence, or bad faith, and that plaintiff had
successfully discharged the burden of establishing a prima facie case, but
'the judgment had to be reversed and a new trial granted because the use
of the mandatory instruction constituted reversible error.
Although the case is one of first -impression in Illinois, the question of
the right to recover from the liability insurer for personal injury judgments in excess of policy limits has been amply litigated in other jurisdictions and has been treated in annotations, 3 encyclopedias, 4 texts, 5 and law
reviews.6 As a Michigan court once stated the point, courts seem to be
"unanimous in the opinion, as expresse 'd by direct ruling, recognition, or
assumption, that the insurer is liable to the insured for an excess of judgment over the face of the policy when the insurer, having exclusive control of settlement, fraudulently or in bad faith refuses to compromise a
claim for an amount within the policy limit. ' ' 7 But courts have been
equially unanimous in refusing to define what constitutes bad faith.
All agree that by virtue of the usual terms of a liability policy, which
vests in the insurer the exclusive right to conduct the defense or negotiations for settlement, the insurer is under a corresponding duty to the in896 (1945).
8 See annotations in 131 A. L. R. 1499; 71 A. L. R. 1485; 43 A. L. R. 329; 37
A. L. R. 1484; 34 A. L. R. 750; 28 A. L. R. 1294; 21 A. L. R. 761; 6 A. L. R. 376;
Ann. Cas. 1918C 399; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 126;'6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 562; L. R. A.
1915A 629.
436 C. J. 1053; 25 Cyc. 224.
5 Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1930) 2d
Ed., p. 912; Richards, Law of Insurance (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1932)
4th Ed. by Long, p. 905.
6 See note in 24 Mich. L. Rev. 173 to Douglas v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924) ;'in 8 Minn. L. Rev. 151 to Auerbach
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923); in 77 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 289 to Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y.
See also Baldwin, "Liability of Insurer for Failure
451, 160 N. E. 911 (1928).
to Settle," 3 Conn. B. J. 114 (1929).
7 City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645 at 648, 225 N. W. 643
at 644 (1929).
2325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N. E. (2d)
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sured to act in good faith. Many courts have attempted to raise this duty
from a principal-agent relationship between insured and insurer, but it
seems that this is an erroneous and confusing use of terms resulting in no
practical advantage. Certainly one of the cardinal characteristics of the
agency relation, to-wit: control by the principal, is utterly lacking in this
situation. Since relationships other than agency wherein one party owes to
another the duty to act in good faith are by no means unknown in the
law, it seems unnecessary to attempt to stretch the law of agency to include
the present problem. Whatever the rationale, there can be no question as
to the existence of such a duty on the part of the insurance carrier. The
major problem has always been to determine whether that duty has been
breached.
An examination of the factual situations presented in the determined
cases should be instructive in order to determine what acts on the part of
the insurer may later be held to amount to bad faith. Many of the suits
have been based on the theory that the insurer was negligent in defending
or negotiating for settlement, with no allegation of bad faith., Some courts
have attempted to differentiate between negligence and bad faith, but the
sounder view would seem to be raised by the query of a New York court
when it inquired: "We may ask what would constitute negligence in the
failure to settle a case, as distinguished from bad faith?"
As insurance policies usually give the insurer an option to defend or
settle, the mere refusal to settle does not constitute bad faith, consequently
courts have held that the insurer is not liable just for a mistake in judgment when exercising such option.' 0 Even slightly more evidence for the
insured has been held insufficient to support a charge of bad faith. In
8 E. g., Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A.
708 (1924).
9 Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451 at 455, 160
N. E. 911 at 912, 71 A. L. R. 1464 at 1466 (1928).
10 Farm Bureau Mut. Autoniobile Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F. (2d) 692 (1941)
State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F. (2d) 730 (1939) ; Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 65 Ind. App. 301. 115 N. E. 348 (1917) ; Georgia Casualty Co. v.
Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. (2d) 777 (1932); New Orleans & C. R. Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905); Rumford Falls Paper Co.
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899) ; Farmers Gin Co. v. St.
Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 186 Miss. 747, 191 So. 415 (1939) ; Georgia Casualty
Co. v. Cotton Mills Products Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931) ; Wynnewood
Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co.. 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946 (1917); McDonald
v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 109 N. J. Law 308, 162 A. 620 (1932); Auerbach
v Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577 (1923); McAleenan v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 219 N. Y. 563, 114 N. E. 114, affirming
173 App. Div. 100, 159 N. Y. S. 401 (1916); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914) ; Burnham v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash. (2d) 624, 117 P. (2d) 644 (1941): Berk v. Milwaukee
Automobile Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, 15 N. W. (2d) 834 (1944).
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Levin v. New England Casualty Company," for example, refusal of a
settlement offer of $3150, to effect which the insured was asked to contribute $750, was not sufficient to support liability. A failure to notify the
insured of an $8500 settlement offer and give him a chance to contribute
the necessary $2000 by which the insurer's counter-offer failed to meet the
demand has also been regarded as insufficient. 12 In another case, where the
first action by the injured party had resulted in a mistrial, the insured
notified thie insurer that all the members of the jury at that trial were for
the injured party and that the insured would expect the insurer to pay all
of any subsequent judgment should it fail to take advantage of opportunities of settlement below the policy limit, it was said that the failure to
settle was not enough to impose liability.' 3 Again, a failure to notify the
insured of an opportunity to settle a judgment in excess of the policy, the
insured being insolvent, did not support a recovery. 14 In Hoyt v. Factory
Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America15 there was some evidence of contributory negligence and of improper medical treatment of
the injured infant, so disregard of the consistent advice of the trial attorney of the insurer that the case be settled was held not to amount to bad
faith. The same rule has been applied where there is conflicting evidence
as to the facts.upon which initial liability rests,' 6 and a similar result has
been obtained where there is doubt as to the legal basis for the claim advanced by the injured person.' 7 In all such situations, the insurer has
been excused for its failure to settle on the basis that it had acted in good
faith, hence had breached no obligation to the insured.
Some of the confusion as to what constitutes bad faith may be due to
a failure to give consideration to the manner through which that issue is
presented. A court is forced to consider different problems and to use
different methods of approach when ruling on the sufficiency of pleadings,
11 233 N. Y. 631, 135 N. E. 948 (1922), affirming 166 N. Y. S. 1055, 174 N. Y. S.
910 (1919). In Lawson & Nelson S. & D. Co. v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 204
Minn. 50, 282 N. W. 481 (1938), a refusal to settle unless the insured contributed
$1500 was likewise deemed insufficient. See also Davis v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 16 La. App. 253, 133 So. 769 (1931).
12 Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E.
911, 71 A. L. R. 1464 (1928).
13 Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 808
(1939).
14 Norwood v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 595, 284 N. W. 785 (1939).
15120 Conn. 156, 179 A. 842 (1935).
16 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 95 F. (2d) 605 (1938).
17 In Silverstein v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 162 N. Y. S. 601, 175 App. Div. 639
(1916), settlement had been made with the infant's mother as guardian ad litem
and the entire defense of the subsequent suit Was based on such release. Bad
faith was deemed to be lacking even though the release was invalid because at
the time of the making thereof the mother had not been appointed to act for the
infant.
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passing on motions for directed verdicts, or deciding issues raised after
verdict. Many of the widely-quoted cases bearing on this problem have
been before the courts simply on rulings on demurrers where the only
problem to decide was whether the complaint stated a cause of action. In
that regard, a different result could be expected than if the issue had been
considered after verdict. One type of illustration will suffice, that dealing
with the question of whether a demand by the insurer for a contribution
from the insured constitutes bad faith. On demurrer, the courts have uniformly held that a complaint alleging bad faith in the insistence upon a
contribution states a cause of action,' 8 but when one such case later reached
the higher court on appeal from a jury finding of bad faith, the court re20
versed. 19 Its action has not gone without recognition.
Complaints have been held good against demurrer where the bad faith
charged involved refusal to compromise below the policy limit unless the
insured contributed and the insurer refused to appeal from a judgment
exceeding the policy limits ;21 or where assurance was given by the insurance carrier that appeal was being or had been taken when, in fact, no
appeal occurred. 22 In Noshey v. American Automobile Insurance Company,28 a complaint charging delay by the insurer's agent in effecting
settlement until it was too late, even though settlement had been urged by
the insured and the insurer's trial attorney, was held to state a cause of
action. Refusal to consider small settlement offers before trial, with a refusal to settle a judgment in excess of the policy for the policy amount,
made during a pending appeal taken without expectation of success, was
regarded as enough to state a cause of action in Tiger River Pine Company
v. Maryland Casualty Company.24 In still another case a charge was
deemed sufficient which alleged that a bad faith refusal to settle existed in
the light of a serious injury, absolute liability on the part of the insured,
25
and the potential danger of a large judgment.
Is Brown & McCabe, Stevedores, Inc. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 232
F. 298 (1915); Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377,
211 N. W. 317 (1926) ; Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Oki. 160, 4f
P. (2d) 916 (1935).
'9Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N. W.
61 (1928).
20 The cases cited in note 11, ante, involved situations where, after trial, the
courts named found that a demand for contribution did not, in fact, amount to
bad faith.
21 Brunswick Realty Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 166 N. Y. S. 36, 90 Misc. 639
(1917).
22 McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 219 N. Y. 563, 114
N. E. 114, affirming 173 App. Div. 100, 159 N. Y. S. 401 (1916).
2368 F. (2d) 808 (1934).
At a trial upon such complaint, Judgment
24 163 S. C. 229, 161 S. E. 491 (1931).
for the insured was affirmed in 170 S. C. 286, 170 S. E. 346 (1933).
25 Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081,
Ann. Cas. 1918C 399 (1916).
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Much the same attitude can be observed when the court is asked to
direct a verdict for the defendant. In a Michigan case, for example, it was
held that the issue ought to go to the jury where the evidence disclosed
that the insurer's trial attorney, after negotiating a compromise subject
to the insurer's approval, warned that the case was dangerous and that a
counter-offer would be futile, despite which the insured refused to settle
26
and gave no reason for the refusal.
When the issues have been submitted, verdicts 'favoring the insured
have been sustained in a number of cases where the bad faith or negligence has been said to rest in a failure on the part of the insurer to make
a diligent investigation to ascertain the facts, but in such cases the failure
has been coupled with a refusal to settle within the policy limits. 27 Judgments have been sustained in other cases, but they are sufficiently dissimilar on the facts as to render them inappropriate for purpose of grouping. Thus, a refusal to settle below the policy limit followed by a refusal
to appeal a judgment in excess thereof was held sufficient, in Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Company,28 to support a recovery for the costs of a
successful appeal conducted by the insured. Again, a refusal to settle
where the injured person was badly hurt, the insured, had no defense, and
'the trial attorney for the insurer, convinced that the verdict would be
high, had recommended settlement, justified recovery in McCombs v.
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York. 29 Other instances of bad
faith can be found where the refusal to settle was made in the face of
adequate warning of the consequence, 3" especially where settlement for
less than the policy amount was rejected unless the insured made a contribution. 3 ' Much clearer are cases where the insurer has refused to assert
defenses adequate in law to defeat recovery,3 2 has made no serious attempt
26 City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N. W. 643
(1929).
27 Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 86 F. (2d) 449 (1936); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F. (2d) 616 (1934); American Mut.
Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F. (2d) 446 (1932) ; Douglas v. United States
Fidelity Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924) ; Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins.
Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N. W. 257 (1930), mandate confirmed on rehearing, 235 N. W.
413 (1931).
28 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622, L. R. A. 1915A 629 (1914).
29231 Mo. App. 1206, 89 S. W. (2d) 114 (1936).
go Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cook-OBrien Const. Co., 69 F. (2d) 462 (1934),
cert. den. 293 U. S. 569, 55 S. Ct. 81, 79 L. Ed. 668 (1934).
31 Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N. W. 300 (1936).
32 In
Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 P. 583 (192-0), the
Insurer refused to permit the defense that the injured person sustained injuries
while engaged in an unlawful act.
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at settlement until too late, 33 or has disregarded all advice and recom3 4
mendation despite an obviously hostile atmosphere during the trial.
An unusual case was presented in Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland
Casualty Company35 wherein the insurer commenced to defend a workmen's compensation suit on the ground that the employment was illegal
but abandoned such defense upon the protest of the insured. It thereafter
refused to settle or to permit the insured to settle. Liability within the
limits of the policy was found to exist but, through the neglect of the insurer, judgment was never, entered. A fire in the courthouse later destroyed all of the records. The case was subsequently restored to the
docket whereupon the injured employee took a nonsuit and sued and won
on a common-law claim, thereby imposing a liability not covered by the
policy. The insured was allowed to recover the amount of such judgment
from the insurer. In another amply litigated case, that of G. A. Stowers
Furniture Company v. American Indemnity Company,3 6 the injured person
offered to settle for $4000, which offer the insurer's attorney recommended
should be accepted as the case was dangerous. The insurer was willing,
however, to pay only $2500. A judgment for the insurer on the pleadings
was affirmed in the intermediate appellate tribunal upon the rather questionable theory that the insured's refusal to contribute was an indication
that the insured shared in a bona fide belief that the claim could be defeated or at least minimized, although such belief proved to be erroneous.
The highest court of the state reversed and remanded the case for trial
before a jury. Verdict favoring the insured was subsequently affirmed.
Despite some discrepancies, then, the cases appear to fit into a fairly
rational pattern. There is no doubt that mere refusal to settle does not
amount to bad faith. It is equally clear that when other circumstances are
coupled with the refusal to settle, that refusal may amount to bad faith.
Failure to make diligent investigation; refusal to enter into negotiations
for settlement; refusal to settle contrary to the advice of the insurer's
agents on the scene; or insistence upon a contribution from the insured to
effect a settlement within policy limits have been regarded as sufficient
additional circumstances, although the latter represents the greatest point
of disagreement in the decided cases. Other factors may be the degree of
33 Cavanaugh Brbs. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 79 N. H. 186,
106 A. 604 (1919).
34Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A. 788 (19.36),

affirmed in 109 Vt. 481. 1 A. (2d) 817 (1938).
35 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W. (2d) 889 (1928).
36 295 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 257 (1927), reversed in 15 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Com.
App.) 544 (1929).
Judgment on the verdict was affirmed in 39 S. W. (2d) (Tex.
Civ. App.) 956 (1931)..
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injury suffered, the consequent probability of a verdict -over the policy
limits, the presence of a hostile atmosphere at trial, or a refusal to consider the interests of the insured. These observations as to bad faith
accord with the converse of the problem, to-wit: what constitutes good
faith. The only attempt to provide a judicial definition of the latter appears in a Wisconsin case where the court suggested that that obligation
required (1) reasonable diligence in ascertaining the facts; (2) an honest
and intelligent decision to contest or settle, based on the facts, plus diligence in carrying out that decision; and (3) the allowance of an opportunity to the insured to protect himself if it seems probable that the amount
37
of recovery will exceed the policy limits.
Viewed either way, the decision in the instant case appears to achieve
an eminently correct result.

JOHN K. WISE.
JOINT TENANCY-SEVERANCE--WHETHER
CUTION BASED ON JUDGMENT AGAINST

OR NOT LEvY UNDER EXE-

ONE OF THE JOINT TENANTS

OPER-

TO DESTROY THE JOINT TENANCY-While the Illinois courts have had
occasion, on the one hand, to decide that the mere rendition of a judgment
against a joint tenant will not act as a severance of the joint tenancy,' and
on the other that a levy and a completed sale thereunder will,2 the ground
in between has been unexplored. The recent case of Van Antwerp v.
Horan,3 however, has provided an opportunity to speak on the subject of
the effect of a levy, made under an execution, upon the share or interest
of one of the joint tenants. It appeared therein that a judgment had been
secured against one joint tenant and execution had been issued and a levy
made thereunder during the joint tenant's lifetime. After his death, the
bailiff prepared to offer the deceased person's interest for sale pursuant. to
levy to satisfy the judgment. The transferee of the surviving joint tenant
brought suit to enjoin such action. A motion to dismiss was made on behalf of the bailiff and the assignee of the judgment creditor based- on the
proposition that the making of the levy acted as a severance of the joint
tenancy. That motion was denied and the defendants elected to stand
thereon. A decree was entered granting plaintiff a permanent injunction.
Upon appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
ATES

37 Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1. 235 N. W. 413 (1931).

'!People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N. E. 85 (1928).
2 Johnson v. Muntz, 364 Il1. 482, 4 N. E. (2d) 826 (1936); Voss v. Rezgis, 343
Ill. 451, 175 N. E. 799 (1931).
s 390 11. 449, 61 N. E. (2d) 358 (1945).
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Joint tenancy was the norm and tenancy in common the exception
under theories prevailing at early common law for reasons peculiar to a
feudal society. With the decline of the feudal system, however, tenancies
in common came to be favored 4 even to the point where some states passed
statutes practically abolishing joint tenancies. 5 An early Illinois statute,
in fact, provided for the partition of joint estates and nullified the doctrine of survivorship which had been an important feature thereof.6 Six
years later, another statute was passed which had the effect of restoring
the right to create joint tenancies. 7 From that time onward, though, the
presumption existed that a tenancy in common had been created unless
the grant or devise made it clear that a joint tenancy was contemplated.8
The statutory form of joint tenancy thus created is, in all other respects,
identical with the common-law estate and requires the presence of the
same four unities made essential for the existence of the earlier type of
joint interest. 9 Absence of any one of them will prevent the creation of
the joint tenancy.
Similarly, a joint tenancy may be terminated, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, by any act which destroys one or more of these constituent
unities.' 0 Voluntary severance can be produced by partition proceedings, 1
or by conveying or mortgaging the interest of one of the joint tenants to
4

Il.

Cover v. James, 217 Ill. 309, 75 N. E. 490 (1905): Mustain v. Gardner, 203

284, 67 N. E. 779 (1903) ; Slater v. Gruger, 165 Ill. 329, 46 N. E. 235 (1897).
5 See O'Connell, "Are Joint Tenancies Abolished in Oregon?" 21 Ore. L. Rev. 159
(1942).
6 Ill. Laws 1821, p. 14. Section 1 provided that all joint tenants "...
may bu
compelled to make partition between them of such lands . . . as they now bold
or hereafter shall hold. as joint tenants .... ." Section 2 directed that if partition
was not made then "the parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the survivor or survivors but descend or pass by devise and shall be subject to debts,
dower, charges, etc., or transmissible to execution or administration and be considered to every intent as a purpose in the same view as if such deceased joint
tenants had been tenants in common."
7 Rev. Laws 1827, p. 97.
Section 5 thereof declared that no estate In joint
tenancy shall be held or claimed "unless the premises therein mentioned shall expressly be thereby declared to pass, not in tenancy in common, but in joint tenancy."
The language of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 76, § 1, is substantially that of the 1827
statute. See also Mette v. Feltgen, 148 Ill. 357, 36 N. E. 81 (1894).
8 Shipley v. Shipley, 324 Ill. 560, 155 N. E. 334 (1927); Svenson v. Hanson,
289 Ill. 242, 124 N. E. 645 (1919).
9 Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 34 N. E. (2d)
414
(1941) ; People v. Varel, 351 Ill. 96, 184 N. E. 209 (1932) ; Deslauriers v. Senesac,
331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327, 62 A. L. R. 511 (1928) : Liese v. Hentze, 326 Ill. 633,
158 N. E. 428 (1927) ; Gaunt v. Stevens. 241 Ill. 542. 89 N. E. 812 (1909) ; Mittel
v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553, 8 L. R. A. 655 (1890).
10 Siemianoski v. Union State Bank of South Chicago, 242 Ill. App. 390 (1926),
cert. den. 242 Ill. App. xv.
11 Spadoni v. Frigo, 307 111. 32, 138 N. E. 226 (1923) : Barr v. Barr, 273 Il.
621, 113 N. E. 36 (1916).
See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 106, § 1.
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a stranger.12 A contract to convey operates, at least in equity, as a severance, 13 and an agreement between the joint tenants to hold as tenants in
common will have the same effect. Such agreemefit, in fact, may be in
14
ferred from the manner in which the parties deal with the property.
Involuntary severance, on the other hand, usually arises through levy and
completed sale of the interest of a joint tenant under an execution against
him for a creditor, by proper action, may reach the interest held by his
debtor, even in a joint tenancy, provided it is done before the debtor's
death. 15
In the case at hand, the judgment creditor had taken out an execution and had levied upon the property but had not proceeded to sale before the joint tenant died, thereby posing the instant problem. In the
earlier case of People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas,18 the creditor had
recovered a judgment against one joint tenant and execution thereon had
been returned unsatisfied. Nothing further took place prior to the death
of the debtor except for the filing of a memorial of the judgment in the
fashion required by the Torrens Act.' 7 It was there held that the grantee
of the surviving joint tenant was entitled to have the memorial removed
as a cloud on the title because such action alone did not sever the joint
estate. The creation of a lien upon the jointly-held real estate by virtue
of the rendition of a judgment' or by the filing of a memorial thereof was
not regarded as sufficient to disrupt the essential unities.
It was said by an eminent common-law writer that the creation by
one joint tenant of a charge upon the land would be a nullity as against
the right of the surviving joint tenant.' 9 It is to be expected, therefore,
that the same thing would be said for judgment liens. Seizure of actual
possession of the land under execution, even prior to sale, has been treated
elsewhere as producing a severance, 20 but it is unlikely that such result
12

Hardin v. Wolf, 318 Ill. 48. 148 N. E. 868 (1925)

:

Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill.

194, 96 N. E. 892 (1911) ; Partridge v. Berliner, 325 Ill 253, 156 N. E. 352 (1927) ;
Ltese v. Hentze, 326 Ill. 633, 158 N. E. 428 (1927). A reconveyance by the stranger
to the former joint tenant will not re-establish the joint tenancy: Szymczak v.
Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 138 N. E. 218 (1923).
13 Naiburg v. Hendriksen, 370 Il1. 502, 19 N. E. (2d) 348 (1939).
14 Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 37 N. E. (2d) 826 (1941).
'5 See cases cited in note 2, ante, and also Midgley v. Walker, 101 Mich. 583, 60
N'. W. 296, 45 Am. St. Rep. 431 (1894); Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178,
34 N. E. 999, 22 L. R. A. 42 (1893).
16 328 Il. 468, 160 N. E. 85 (1928).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 30, § 122.
is Ibid., Ch. 77, § 1.
19 Litt. § 286; Co. Litt., Vol. 1, Book II, Ch. 25, p. 862.
20 Lessee of Davidson v. Heydon, 7 Pa. St. (2 Yeates) 459 (1799), citing Co.
[itt. 184b.
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would be reached in this state for levy alone does not disturb the debtor's
right to possession. 2 1 Furthermore, the mere levy of execution only serves
to make the interest of the debtor liable to be taken and sold to satisfy the
judgment. It does not destroy his title in the property, nor serve to create
one in the judgment creditor. Although a joint interest in personal property may be destroyed by levy thereon since it may result in the absolute
appropriation of the property to the possession of the sheriff, 22 such is not
the case as to real property. 28 Such a levy is merely a step in the process
toward securing satisfaction of the judgment. It would, therefore, seem
that nothing short of a completed sale, including the expiration of the
period of redemption, would operate to destroy the debtor's joint interest
in this state. Until then, all incidents of the joint tenancy are to be regarded as fully effective and none of the essential unities impaired.
H. H. FLENTYE.

"The nature of proceedings by
22 Freeman, Executions, Vol. II, § 282, states:
levy and sale (if land) under execution is entirely different from that which
formerly resulted in setting off to the creditor of sufficient lands of the debtor
to discharge the debt. By a levy of land under execution the. creditor acquires
no property in the land, absolute or conditional. Such a levy, unless consummated
by a sale (and then only to the extent of the proceeds realized), is no ,satisfaction
of the judgment."
(3 Gil.) 311 (1846) ; Ambrose v. Weed, 11 Ill.488
22 Pearl v. Wellman, 8 Il1.
(1850) ; Curtis v. Root, 28 Ill. 367 (1862) ; French v. Snyder, 30 IlL 339 (1863)
'Trenary v. Cheever, 48 111. 28 (1868).
23 It 'has been held that a levy on real estate is not, like a levy upon personal property, a prima facie satisfaction of the judgment. See Gregory v. Stark, 4 Ill.
(3 Scam.) 611 (1842) ; Gold v. Johnson, 59 Ill. 63 (1871); Herrick v. Swartwout,
72 Ill. 340 (1874); Robinson v. Brown, 82 Ill. 279 (1876); Scott v. Aultman Co.,
211 Ill. 612, 71 N. E. 1112 (1904).

